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Abstract 
ISO 26262 describes a safety engineering approach in which the safety 
of a system is considered from the early stages of design through a 
process of elicitation and allocation of system safety requirements. 
These are expressed as automotive safety integrity levels (ASILs) at 
system level and are then progressively allocated to subsystems and 
components of the system architecture. In recent work, we have 
demonstrated that this process can be automated using a novel 
combination of model-based safety analysis and optimization 
metaheuristics. The approach has been implemented in the HiP-HOPS 
tool, and it leads to optimal economic decisions on component ASILs. 
In this paper, first, we discuss this earlier work and demonstrate 
automatic ASIL decomposition on an automotive example. Secondly, 
we describe an experiment where we applied two different modes of 
ASIL decomposition. In HiP-HOPS, it is possible to decompose ASILs 
either to the safety requirements of components or individual failure 
modes of components. Protection against independent failure modes 
could, in theory, be achieved at different ASILs and this will lead to 
reduced design costs. Although ISO26262 does not explicitly support 
this option, we have studied the implications of this more refined 
decomposition on system costs but also on the performance of the 
decomposition process itself, and we report on the results. Finally, 
motivated by our study on ASIL decomposition, we discuss the general 
need for increased automation of safety analysis in complex systems, 
especially autonomous systems where an infinity of possible 
operational states and configurations makes manual analysis 
infeasible. 
Introduction 
Systems of classification for different levels of safety integrity have 
been introduced in several different safety standards. While the safety 
standard IEC 61508 first popularized the Safety Integrity Level (SIL), 
other safety standards such as ISO 26262 and ARP4754-A developed 
domain specific versions. The aerospace industry, for example, 
defines the Development Assurance Level (DAL) in their ARP4754-
A standard. ISO 26262, an automotive safety standard [1] defines the 
Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) which is the focus of the 
work in this paper, though the principles are applicable generally 
across domains.  
One of the purposes of the ASIL is to address the issue of traceability 
with regards to safety in the design of systems. This should be 
applicable from the early stages of the design process, while initial 
concepts are being considered, right through to the operational phases 
of the final product and capture how requirements have been refined 
and met by the design. 
The inevitable and increasing use of software systems in place of 
purely mechanical systems has meant that traditional techniques of 
expressing safety requirements as maximum target probabilities for 
system failures are no longer sufficient. 
The ASIL concept is used instead to represent the stringency of 
safety requirements with respect to software and systematic failures 
in general. They range from ASIL A (least strict) to ASIL D (most 
strict). Additionally, QM is used when no special safety requirements 
are needed indicating only routine Quality Management should be 
applied. 
The elicitation of these safety requirements, as prescribed by the ISO 
26262 standard, begins with a hazard and risk analysis to identify 
potential malfunctions and their hazardous consequences. Based on 
the severity, likelihood, and controllability of the identified hazards 
an ASIL is assigned to the hazard to generate the necessary 
requirements to ensure that any associated risks are reduced to an 
acceptable level. 
Traceability is partially delivered through the process of allocation 
and decomposition of the ASILs throughout the sub-systems and sub-
functions of the system as it is refined from the early concepts. The 
ISO 26262 standard describes how components that directly cause a 
hazard receive the ASIL of the hazard. It also lays out guidelines for 
where multiple components must be involved to cause the hazard. In 
this instance the components can share the burden of complying with 
the hazard’s ASIL. A process of decomposition (described further 
later) is defined by the standard to specify what options are allowed 
when distributing the load of responsibility for meeting a hazards 
ASIL. 
However, the practical application of this decomposition is fraught 
with difficulty. It requires practitioners to have intricate knowledge of 
the system being considered including the consequences of 
architectural failure behavior and how it propagates through the 
system. This problem is exacerbated by the increases in complexity 
found in modern systems with more and more interconnected 
functions delivered through a mix of software and hardware. An 
explosion of possible operational states, particularly in autonomous 
systems that are required to work in heterogeneous environments 
make it even more difficult. The lack of supporting examples in the 
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ISO 26262 standard is not helpful here and the lack of clarity can 
often lead to mistakes [2].  
A further consideration that is not provided by the standard is that 
meeting the safety requirement is not the end of the story when it 
comes to the practical application of the guidance. Coming up with a 
decomposition of ASILs in a system that satisfies the safety 
requirements of the identified hazards is a difficult task by itself. 
However, doing so is in fact merely meeting a constraint. Once that 
constraint has been met (or in meeting that constraint) it becomes 
necessary to consider the cost implications of doing so. 
Applying different levels of stringency to the safety processes of 
system development has knock on effects on the cost of said 
development. The ability to allocate and decompose ASILs in a 
system in a cost effective (even cost optimal) way further strengthens 
the need for automated methods. 
Various approaches have been made to provide automated assistance 
to the problem of ASIL decomposition beginning with an exhaustive 
deterministic method [3], and including optimization approaches such 
as linear programming [4], exact solvers [5], penalty-based genetic 
algorithms [6], and Tabu-search [7]. 
The remainder of the paper will outline a case study that will be used 
to illustrate the process of modelling a system for ASIL 
decomposition. It will highlight the need for an automated process for 
applying the decomposition in a cost optimal way and how to do this 
using a variation on earlier work [7]. Finally, it will discuss the 
results of applying the process at different levels of granularity 
(components versus their failure modes) and the implications of 
doing so. 
Hybrid Braking System Case Study 
The effects of the different decomposition techniques will be 
illustrated on the following example system (in more detail [8-9]) 
shown in Figure 1. It is designated a ‘hybrid’ braking system as the 
braking effort is provided through the combination of electro-
mechanical brakes (EMB) and the regenerative energy capture from 
the in-wheel motors (IWM). 
 
 
Figure 1. The hybrid-braking system example. 
Driver intention is delivered through a mechanical pedal that is 
sensed and processed through an electronic pedal unit in this brake-
by-wire system. The system comprises 4 wheel braking modules, 
each able to operate independently. In the diagram, wheel brake 
module 4 shows detail of its components that is matched but not 
displayed by the other 3 modules. Braking instructions delivered 
through the redundant duplex communications bus are received by 
the wheel node controllers (WNC). The WNCs calculate the action 
required from the wheel’s EMB and IWM actuators and deliver the 
instructions to the respective power converters. The IWM can 
provide braking functionality by converting the kinetic energy of the 
vehicle to electric charge which is delivered to the main powertrain 
battery. This has the benefit of increasing the range of the vehicle, but 
at high speeds and periods when the battery is in a full state of charge 
the full braking needs of the vehicle cannot be met. Hence the need 
for the partnering EMB. The EMB draws power from an auxiliary 
battery. 
In this example, the hazards in Table 1 were identified for the system 
and, based on the severity of the hazard, the respective ASILs were 
assigned to them. 
Table 1. This table shows the assigned ASILs for the top-level hazards of the 
system. 
# Hazard ASIL 
1 Incorrect Value Braking D 
2 Loss of Braking Rear Wheels C 
3 Loss of Braking Front Wheels D 
4 Loss of Braking Diagonal Wheels C 
5 Loss of Braking 3 out of 4 Wheels D 
6 Loss of Braking All Wheels D 
 
The first hazard in the table represents the scenario where a particular 
value of braking is requested from the system and a different value is 
delivered. This could result in either excessive or insufficient 
braking. The remaining hazards in the table represent an omission of 
braking (i.e. braking is requested and none is delivered) in 
combinations of one or more of the 4 wheels.  
System Modelling 
An important part of the methodology being used here is the ability to 
iterate on the design. To that end, all of the information being used in 
the process is derived directly from the system model and provides 
traceability back from the results to the original model. 
The topology of the system model has been modelled in Matlab and 
Simulink. It is provided by the components, their port interfaces, and 
the connections between them.  
The system’s failure model is provided by augmenting the 
topological model with local failure behavior for each of the 
components. This local failure behavior is added to the model using 
HiP-HOPS failure expressions. They describe how deviations of 
output in a component are caused by either an internal failure of the 
component or through the propagation of failure from elsewhere in 
the model represented as a deviation of input of the component. 
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For example, in this case study model, the EMB Power Converter can 
fail with an omission of output. This can be caused either by an 
internal omission causing failure (OFailure) or by an omission 
deviation of either of its two inputs.  
Omission-Out = Omission-In1 or Omission-In2 or OFailure 
In contrast the WNC component has two outputs. Each of them can 
fail by omission, but this deviation of output is either caused by a 
specific internal failure (OFailure1 and OFailure2 respectively) or by 
the combination of an omission deviation at both of the inputs. 
Omission-Out1 = (Omission-In1 and Omission-In2) or OFailure1 
Omission-Out2 = (Omission-In1 and Omission-In2) or OFailure2 
Note that at this stage, the system is under design so the precise 
internal electrical/mechanical/functional component failures are not 
known. However, the design intention is known and therefore what 
constitutes potential output failures and their intended relationship to 
input failures is known. Beyond this, one can hypothesise that each 
output failure can be caused by one yet unspecified collective internal 
cause. It is precisely these requirements for avoidance and 
containment of these internal causes that the decomposition exercise 
tries to establish via analysis of propagation and effects of those 
causes of failure. Each failure expression describes a mini-fault tree 
and each of the components in the system may have one or more to 
describe how the component propagates, generates, or mitigates 
failure that it is presented with. 
Any deviations of output are propagated through the connections in 
the model to the inputs of the connected components. In the example, 
the first output of the WNC is connected to one of the inputs of the 
EMB Power Converter. Matching failure classes (e.g. Omission) 
found at either end of such a connection allow the mini-fault trees to 
be joined. 
For example, the omission of the second input of the EMB Power 
Converter can be replaced by the expression for the omission of the 
first output of the WNC. 
Omission-EMBPC.Out = Omission- EMBPC.In1 or (Omission-
WNC.In1 and Omission-WNC.In2) or WNC.OFailure1 or 
EMBPC.OFailure 
The part of the expression that relates to the WNC is shown above in 
bold and additional identifiers have been added to indicate which 
component the ports and failures originate in. 
This process of combining the mini-fault trees of the components 
begins at the hazards that have been identified for the system. These 
are connected to the outputs of the systems using the same Boolean 
expressions. For example, the hazard “Loss of braking of all wheels” 
is connected using the following expression: 
Omission-Brake_Unit1.Braking and  
Omission-Brake_Unit2.Braking and  
Omission-Brake_Unit3.Braking and  
Omission-Brake_Unit4.Braking 
Each braking units’ omission of output as a failure expression that 
refers to an omission of both the EMB and the IWM function, and so 
on. This process of combining the mini-fault trees of the components 
in the model continue until all of the connected input deviations have 
been resolved. 
The result is a complete fault tree that is generated for each hazard 
defined for the system. The fault tree describes the propagation of 
failure from the internal failures of the components (the basic events 
are the leaf nodes of the tree) to the top-level hazards of the system 
through the combination of Boolean logic. 
To be used for the ASIL decomposition process it is necessary to 
have the fault propagation in it minimal form. This is provided 
through the automatic fault tree analysis capabilities of the HiP-
HOPS engine and results in a set of minimal, non-redundant, cut sets. 
For the case study example this results in 6 fault trees (one for each 
of the hazards), each of which shares branches with the others. 
Consequently, the cut sets that are generated as the result of the fault 
tree analyses will be shared across multiple hazards. Table 2 shows 
the number of minimal cut sets generated for each of the hazards. 
Table 2. This table shows the number of minimal cut sets for each of the top-
level hazards of the system. 
# Hazard Cut Sets 
1 Incorrect Value Braking 1302 
2 Loss of Braking Rear Wheels 103 
3 Loss of Braking Front Wheels 103 
4 Loss of Braking Diagonal Wheels 202 
5 Loss of Braking 3 out of 4 Wheels 3136 
6 Loss of Braking All Wheels 6727 
 total 11573 
 
The cut sets are important for the ASIL decomposition process as 
each minimal cut set gives a combination of failure modes that is 
both necessary and sufficient to cause the hazard. For example, one 
of the cut sets of the “Loss of Braking Rear Wheels” hazard is an 
internal omission causing failure of both the auxiliary battery and the 
powertrain battery. 
In particular, the cut sets of order 2 or more (non single points of 
failure) derived directly from the model show the subsystem 
independence that is required for decomposition. 
The ASIL that has been assigned to this hazard is C. In order to 
satisfy the safety requirements of the system for this cut set, the ASIL 
of each of the failures in this cut set could be developed to ASIL C 
also. However, the ASIL decomposition described in ISO 26262 
allows for the allocation of reduced stringency where independent 
redundancy can be shown. In this case, because the failure of both the 
powertrain and the auxiliary battery is required to cause the specified 
hazard, the stringency of the ASIL allocated to each of these failures 
can be reduced according to the given algebra. 
∑ 𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐿𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗 ≥  𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑
𝑖
𝑗=1
 
(1) 
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To facilitate this, each of the ASILs can be represented by an integer 
value 0 to 4 as shown in table 3. 
Table 3. This table shows the algebraic value for each ASIL. 
ASIL Algebra 
Value 
QM 0 
A 1 
B 2 
C 3 
D 4 
 
Table 4 shows all the combinations of ASILs that could be 
decomposed to the powertrain and auxiliary battery failures 
respectively along with the algebraic values for each of those ASILs. 
The final column shows the sum value of the two algebraic values. 
Where the sum value equals or exceeds 3 (the algebra value 
associated with ASIL C) the decomposition is deemed to be valid. 
The last 6 combinations have a sum value of less than three so can be 
discarded as invalid decompositions. The four shaded rows show the 
combinations that exactly meet the requirement. The remaining 15 
rows also exceed the stringency of the safety requirement. These can 
be considered a valid decomposition, however it is likely to be 
suboptimal once cost is considered as generally delivering a function 
at a higher safety integrity level is more costly. 
 Table 4. This table shows the ASIL algebra of possible choices for 
decomposition due to the powertrain and auxiliary battery cut set for the “loss 
of braking rear wheels” hazard. The shaded area shows the configurations that 
exactly meet the requirement. 
Powertrain battery Auxiliary battery 
sum 
ASIL algebra ASIL algebra 
D 4 D 4 8 
D 4 C 3 7 
C 3 D 4 7 
D 4 B 2 6 
B 2 D 4 6 
C 3 C 3 6 
D 4 A 1 5 
A 1 D 4 5 
C 3 B 2 5 
B 2 C 3 5 
D 4 QM 0 4 
QM 0 D 4 4 
C 3 A 1 4 
A 1 C 4 4 
B 2 B 2 4 
A 1 B 2 3 
B 2 A 1 3 
C 3 QM 0 3 
QM 0 C 3 3 
A 1 A 1 2 
B 2 QM 0 2 
QM 0 B 2 2 
A 1 QM 0 1 
QM 0 A 1 1 
QM 0 QM 0 0 
 
If we consider this one hazard, then we can be satisfied that if any of 
the shaded combinations from the table are chosen, then we will meet 
the requirements of avoiding the hazard. However, the reality is more 
complicated. 
This cut set is shared across multiple hazards. One of these is the 
“Loss of Braking All Wheels” hazard that was assigned ASIL D. 
When we include this constraint, the shaded combinations are no 
longer valid as their sum value is less than 4, the algebraic value for 
ASIL D. 
There are 5 combinations that exactly meet the ASIL D requirement, 
but further factors need to be considered before making a final 
selection. 
The cut set under consideration is of order 2 and contains the failure 
of the auxiliary battery and the powertrain battery. The auxiliary 
battery failure is part of an additional 9 order 3 cut sets of the “Loss 
of Braking Rear” hazard.  
As an example we can consider one of these cut sets: omission failure 
of the auxiliary battery and the IWM of brake unit 3 and the IWM of 
brake unit 4. The decomposition that we choose for this cut set is 
affected by the choice of decomposition from the previous cut set. If 
we chose to allocate ASIL D to the auxiliary battery in the previous 
cut set, then we could potentially allocate QM to each of the omission 
failures of the IWMs of brake unit 3 and 4. However, if we had 
chosen one of the other decompositions such as QM to the auxiliary 
battery (and ASIL D to the powertrain battery), then the stringency of 
the decompositions to the other failures in the second cut set would 
have needed to be higher to meet the requirements. 
If we also consider the “Loss of Braking All Wheels” hazard that 
adds another 81 order 5 cut sets. Then it is necessary to also consider 
the auxiliary battery’s contribution to 3 other hazards and all of their 
cut sets. Similarly, the choice of decomposition to the first cut set pair 
also has knock on effects for any and all cut sets that contain the 
powertrain battery. 
The ASIL algebra provides a way of determining the validity of a 
given decomposition. There are however additional factors that will 
influence the choice of ASIL combinations when decomposing in a 
system. A significant one is development cost. The ASIL allocated to 
a component represents the stringency of requirements that need to be 
complied with when developing it. Therefore, the higher the ASIL 
the higher the development cost. Where the safety requirements can 
be met, it is desirable to find an decomposition of ASILs that 
minimizes the cost of doing so. 
It is often the case in the early stages of the design process, that the 
precise development costs of the components or functions in a system 
cannot be provided. That does not mean that cost cannot be 
considered as part of the decomposition process. In lieu of individual 
component costs, it is possible to consider the relative expected cost 
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of development. In the simplest case, the algebra values in table 3 can 
be used as a linear cost, but this doesn’t serve in further 
distinguishing the different combinations of decompositions. Table 5 
provides a non-linear cost heuristic based on the experiential 
observation that the difference in cost between ASIL B to ASIL C is 
greater than the difference between the other ASILs [10]. 
Further exploration of the application of different cost heuristics to 
the optimization of ASIL decomposition can be found here [11]. 
Table 5. This table shows the experiential cost heuristic for each ASIL. 
ASIL Cost 
QM 0 
A 10 
B 20 
C 40 
D 50 
 
When you apply this cost heuristic to the decomposition 
combinations available for the auxiliary battery and powertrain 
battery cut set in the “Loss of Braking Rear Wheels” hazard you get 
the results shown in Table 6. According to the heuristic, the shaded 
combinations are less costly than the unshaded combinations despite 
both meeting the safety requirement for that hazard. 
Table 6. This table shows the estimated cost of possible choices for 
decomposition due to the powertrain and auxiliary battery cut set for the “loss 
of braking rear wheels” hazard.  
Powertrain battery Auxiliary battery total 
cost 
ASIL cost ASIL Cost 
A 10 B 20 30 
B 20 A 10 30 
C 40 QM 0 40 
QM 0 C 40 40 
 
It is important to remember that the failures in the cut sets are shared 
in multiple cut sets across multiple hazard fault trees. Therefore, in 
order to calculate the cost for the system it is summed once per 
failure and not once for every occurrence in the cut sets. 
It is clear that achieving valid ASIL decompositions at minimal cost 
across a system manually is a practically impossible task. The many 
possible combinations, the multiple constraints provided by the 
hazards, and the knock-on effect of the interconnected fault trees and 
cut sets, leads to a combinatorial explosion. This is an optimization 
problem that requires the use of automated optimization algorithms to 
solve. 
To do this it is necessary to encode potential solutions to the ASIL 
decomposition problem. The problem that is to be solved is: what is 
the ASIL requirement of each component/failure mode in the system 
such that the requirements assigned to the hazards are satisfied; and 
at minimum cost. The encoding that the algorithm can work with is a 
list of all the unique failure modes in the system and the ASIL that 
has been allocated to it. An example of this is shown in Figure 2. 
Solutiont 
FM1 FM2 FM3 FM4 FM5 
B D C B A 
Figure 2. Example solution encoding at iteration t showing the ASILs 
allocated to each unique failure mode in the system. 
An encoding can be validated against the hazards’ ASILs by 
considering each cut set in turn, summing the ASIL algebra values of 
each of the failure modes from the cut set (as provided by the 
encoding list) and noting whether the sum result is equal to or 
exceeds the value of the current cut set’s hazard ASIL. If this is true 
for all of the cut sets of all of the hazards, then the current encoding is 
valid. 
The cost of a solution is calculated by looking up the cost (such as in 
Table 5) of each allocated ASIL in the encoding and summing them 
together to provide the total ASIL related costs of the system. The 
example shown in Figure 2 has the ASIL cost of 140 (20 + 50 + 40 + 
20 + 10). 
Tabu search 
The optimization technique applied for this paper uses a Tabu search 
variant algorithm [7]. It is based on the Steepest Ascent Mildest 
Descent (SAMD) method used by Hansen and Lih [12] for their work 
on system reliability optimization. One modification made for the 
ASIL decomposition problem is to adapt the method to a Steepest 
Descent Mildest Ascent (SDMA) as the algorithm seeks to minimize 
the development costs associated with the safety requirements, rather 
than the maximization objective of the SAMD approach. 
The SDMA method attempts to follow the steepest descent path 
through the search space until a local minimum is detected. In order 
to escape the local minima, the algorithm uses the mildest ascent 
route available to it.  
In order to achieve the steepest descent during an iteration of the 
algorithm it is necessary to choose a failure mode from the encoding 
and reduce its decomposed ASIL by one (i.e. from ASIL C to ASIL 
B). The reduction in the chosen failure mode’s ASIL should result in 
the largest reduction in system cost. In the case of the example shown 
in Figure 2 the chosen failure mode would be FM3. The cost 
difference of reducing from ASIL C to ASIL B is 20, whereas the 
cost difference of all of the other available reductions is 10 (ASIL D 
to C, ASIL B to A, and ASIL A to QM as given by the cost heuristic 
in Table 5). The resultant encoding is shown in Figure 3. 
Solutiont+1 
FM1 FM2 FM3 FM4 FM5 
B D B B A 
Figure 3. Example solution encoding at iteration t+1 where the steepest 
descent was followed by reducing the ASIL of FM3, shown in bold. 
To demonstrate selecting the mildest ascent we will assume that the 
solution at iteration t+1 in Figure 3 is in a local minimum. This can 
occur if it is not possible to reduce any of the ASILs in the solution 
without invalidating one or more of the hazards’ safety requirements. 
To produce the mildest ascent, it is necessary to choose one of the 
failure modes and increase the ASIL of its safety requirement by one 
such that it results in the smallest increase in cost. In the case of our 
example we would select FM5 resulting in an increase in cost of 10. 
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The other choices either result in an increase in cost of 20 (FM1, 
FM3, and FM4 from ASIL B to ASIL C) or cannot be increase 
further (FM2 ASIL D). The resultant encoding is shown in Figure 4. 
Solutiont+2 
FM1 FM2 FM3 FM4 FM5 
B D B B B 
Figure 4. Example solution encoding at iteration t+2 where the mildest ascent 
was followed by increasing the ASIL of FM5, shown in bold. 
An adaptive memory structure (the Tabu list) is used to prevent the 
algorithm from making reverse moves and falling back in to local 
minima. A variable fi (where i refers to the failure mode that was just 
increased) stores how many iterations a reverse move will be 
forbidden for. After making an ascent move this variable is set to a 
number of iterations p. Conversely, following a descent move, the 
variable f’i is set to a number of iterations p’ and stores for how many 
iterations the failure mode will be blocked from increasing. 
The use of such a memory structure increases the diversity in the 
search by forcing the algorithm to be more explorative. In order to 
decrease the algorithms sensitivity to the initial selection of the p and 
p’ values, they are adjusted dynamically, incrementing at intervals 
updatePeriodp and updatePeriodp’ respectively. When they reach 
their maximum values limitp and limitq’, they are reset to zero. 
The algorithm includes an aspiration criterion which allows it to 
make a move forbidden by the memory structure if the resultant 
solution will be superior to any found previously.  
Figure 5 summarizes the SDMA Tabu search algorithm used in this 
paper. 
 
Figure 5. Tabu search overview. 
Failure Modes versus Components 
Earlier work with the HiP-HOPS ASIL decomposition techniques 
used the Tabu search algorithm as described in this paper. The 
encoding for the search algorithm stores an ASIL value for each of 
the failure modes in the system. It is theorized that taking advantage 
of the automatic fault tree analysis at the granularity of the failure 
modes allows for the specification of safety requirements for the 
development of (sub-) systems and their components that would be 
superior (less costly) than if forced to allocate at the component level. 
This approach considers ASIL decomposition at a level that is not 
described in the ISO 26262 standard, which speaks only of 
decomposing down to the level of component. 
This paper takes a closer look at the consequences of such a limit in 
terms of the solutions possible when decomposing down to the failure 
modes as compared to different approaches for achieving this at the 
component level. 
The first approach being considered is a naïve conversion. This 
involves running the previous ASIL decomposition algorithm to 
allocate ASILs to the failure modes of the system. The failure modes 
can be traced back to the system model that generated them. This 
means that for each component in the system, it is possible to collect 
the highest ASIL that was decomposed to one of its failures. 
For example, in the HBS case study, the auxiliary battery component 
has two failure modes: an omission and a value failure. As a result of 
the optimization algorithm, they are allocated ASIL B and ASIL D 
respectively. Selecting the highest of these values results in us 
allocating ASIL D to the auxiliary battery component. 
The second approach involves altering the optimization algorithm so 
that the encoding of the solution is not a list of ASILs decomposed to 
each of the failure modes in the system, but rather at the less granular 
level of the components. The algorithm manipulates the allocated 
ASILs in the encoding in the same manner as before. However, in 
order to establish the validity of the decomposition it is necessary to 
associate the components ASIL with all of its failure modes. These in 
turn are then used to validate the decompositions through the cut sets 
as before. 
An example of this would be that if the ASIL allocated to the 
auxiliary battery in the solution encoding was ASIL C, then both the 
omission failure and the value failure of that component would be set 
to ASIL C. The validity check would reveal this to be an invalid 
decomposition due to one or more of the hazards’ ASIL requirement. 
To calculate the development cost in both approaches to optimizing 
the ASIL decomposition at the component level, the value is 
calculated by summing the heuristic cost of the effective component 
faults’ ASILs. For example, the cost of setting the auxiliary battery 
ASIL to C is 80 because it has two failure modes that both derive 
their ASILs from the parent component. It is done this way for this 
paper so that the resultant cost can be directly compared from all 
three approaches. 
Results 
Table 7 shows the results of running the optimization algorithm in 
each of the three approaches. The first column indicates the 60 
unique failure modes in the Hybrid braking case study. The naming 
convention used here gives first the name of the component followed 
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by the name of the failure mode separated by a period. For example, 
EMB1.Omission refers to the omission failure of the electro-
mechanical brake in the first wheel brake module. 
The second (Hazard) column shows the hazards (indexed in table 1 
with its ASIL) that the failure mode contributes to through the 
(many) cut sets (shown in table 2). In all cases the failure mode 
contributes (at least indirectly) to a hazard with ASIL D. The third 
(FM) column shows the ASIL that is allocated using the pure direct 
to failure mode optimization approach. The fourth (FM->C) column 
shows the ASIL that are derived from assigning the highest ASIL 
from the first approach to the parent component of each of the failure 
modes. The final column (C) shows the ASIL that is allocated when 
the optimization algorithm decomposes the ASILs directly to the 
components of the system. 
At the bottom of the table the ASIL development cost is noted for 
each of the three approaches. 
The shaded cells in the last column highlight where the allocations 
made by the two different component focused algorithms are 
different. 
Table 7. This table shows the decomposed ASILs for the failure modes of the 
system when using the different decomposition techniques. The FM column 
shows the original HiP-HOPS technique that decomposes to the failure modes 
in the system. The FM->C column post-processes the ASILs to assign the 
highest sub-value to each component. The C column optimizes directly to the 
components. The cells marked in grey highlight differences between the latter 
two results. 
 ASILs allocated per: 
Failure Mode  Hazard FM FM -> C C 
Battery_Aux.Omission 2-5 B D D 
Battery_Aux.Value 1 D D D 
Battery_PT.Omission 2-5 B B B 
Battery_PT.Value 1 B B B 
Communication_Bus1.Omission 2-5 B D D 
Communication_Bus2.Omission 2-5 B D D 
Electronic_Pedal.Omission1 1-6 D D D 
Electronic_Pedal.Omission2 2-5 B D D 
Electronic_Pedal.Value1 1 D D D 
Electronic_Pedal.Value2 1 D D D 
Mechanical_Pedal.Omission 1-6 B D D 
Mechanical_Pedal.Value 1 D D D 
EMB1.Omission 3-6 QM QM B 
EMB1.Value 1 QM QM B 
EMB1_Power_Converter.Omission 3-6 QM QM B 
EMB1_Power_Converter.Value 1 QM QM B 
IWM1.Omission 3-6 A A B 
IWM1.Value 1 QM A B 
IWM1_Power_Converter.Omission 3-6 QM A B 
IWM1_Power_Converter.Value 1 A A B 
WNC1.Omission1 3-6 QM A B 
WNC1.Omission2 3-6 A A B 
WNC1.Value1 1 QM A B 
WNC1.Value2 1 QM A B 
EMB2.Omission 3-6 B B QM 
EMB2.Value 1 B B QM 
EMB2_Power_Converter.Omission 3-6 B B QM 
EMB2_Power_Converter.Value 1 B B QM 
IWM2.Omission 3-6 A B QM 
IWM2.Value 1 B B QM 
IWM2_Power_Converter.Omission 3-6 B B QM 
IWM2_Power_Converter.Value 1 A B QM 
WNC2.Omission1 3-6 B B QM 
WNC2.Omission2 3-6 A B QM 
WNC2.Value1 1 B B QM 
WNC2.Value2 1 B B QM 
EMB3.Omission 2,4-6 A A B 
EMB3.Value 1 A A B 
EMB3_Power_Converter.Omission 2,4-6 A A B 
EMB3_Power_Converter.Value 1 A A B 
IWM3.Omission 2,4-6 QM A B 
IWM3.Value 1 A A B 
IWM3_Power_Converter.Omission 2,4-6 A A B 
IWM3_Power_Converter.Value 1 QM A B 
WNC3.Omission1 2,4-6 A A B 
WNC3.Omission2 2,4-6 QM A B 
WNC3.Value1 1 A A B 
WNC3.Value2 1 A A B 
EMB4.Omission 2,4-6 A A QM 
EMB4.Value 1 A A QM 
EMB4_Power_Converter.Omission 2,4-6 A A QM 
EMB4_Power_Converter.Value 1 A A QM 
IWM4.Omission 2,4-6 A A QM 
IWM4.Value 1 A A QM 
IWM4_Power_Converter.Omission 2,4-6 A A QM 
IWM4_Power_Converter.Value 1 A A QM 
WNC4.Omission1 2,4-6 A A QM 
WNC4.Omission2 2,4-6 A A QM 
WNC4.Value1 1 A A QM 
WNC4.Value2 1 A A QM 
Total cost  840 1100 1020 
 
What these results show is that the finer granularity of allocating 
down to the level of the failure modes allows the algorithm to find a 
more cost-effective solution. This would seem to be highly desirable 
in situations where vendors would be able to deliver components that 
can meet specific safety requirements for the different failure modes 
of the parts, or where the component is effectively a subsystem and 
adequate partitioning can be established between elements within. 
Where this is not possible it is necessary to specify the safety 
requirements at the level of the components, which is more in 
keeping with the process as laid out by the ISO 26262 standard. Here, 
using the failure mode allocation technique and converting the results 
to the component level produces and inferior, less cost-effective 
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solution that optimizing directly to the components using the 
specialized algorithm. 
In the latter approach the components of each wheel brake module 
are treated more uniformly and because they represent independent 
redundancy the distribution of the ASILs is more favorable. 
Table 8. This table shows an alternative logarithmic cost heuristic for each 
ASIL. 
ASIL Cost 
QM 0 
A 10 
B 100 
C 1000 
D 10000 
 
This is not the end of the story however as the ability of the direct to 
component allocation algorithm to find superior solutions to the 
conversion approach depends on the cost heuristic being used. If, for 
example, a logarithmic cost heuristic is used like that in Table 8, then 
the solution identified by the two component focused approaches is 
the same. This is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9. This table shows the costs of running the different optimization 
approaches with a logarithmic cost heuristic such as in Table 8. 
ASILs allocated per: 
FM FM -> C C 
51150 100680 100680 
 
In order for the direct to component optimization to find superior 
solutions, it is necessary for the cost heuristic to have moves between 
different ASILs to have interchangeable cost differences. For 
example, with the cost heuristic shown in Table 5 only the jump from 
ASIL B to ASIL C is unique (20 units compared to 10 for all the 
other jumps). The logarithmic cost heuristic in Table 8 has unique 
cost jumps for all of its ASILs. It should be noted that the direct to 
failure mode approach finds markedly superior solutions in all cases. 
An additional consideration is the performance cost. When 
optimizing directly to the components the search space is 
considerably reduced. There are 60 failure modes in the case study 
system but only 24 components. The direct to components algorithm 
took a little over a second to complete one run of the algorithm 
compared to just under 9 seconds to run the direct to failure modes 
algorithm.  
With these different factors in consideration it appears that the 
obvious choice when constrained to consider ASILs at a component 
level only is to use an algorithm that specially targets that objective 
directly. It is quicker, and the resultant configuration of ASIL 
allocations may be superior.  
However, if it is possible to consider the allocation of ASILs to the 
more granular level of the failure modes of a system, then a more cost 
effective solution is likely to be found. 
Conclusions 
The safety engineering approach described in the automotive 
standard ISO 26262 requires the consideration of safety right from 
the early stages of the design process. One of the key pillars of this 
are the ASILs that can be assigned to the safety requirements of the 
system. Importantly, these requirements can then be distributed 
throughout the components of the system and decomposed where 
independent redundancy can be shown to manage the cost of meeting 
these requirements. 
There is additional effort/cost required due to decomposition (for 
example, proof of independence needed) which isn’t considered in 
this study. This cost likely not negligible and it would be worth 
estimating these costs in the future. However, decomposition is 
precisely used in order to reduce costs so the relative cost of 
decomposition in general must be significantly lower than the 
benefits of reducing ASILs. 
Doing this manually, even in small systems is impractical to the point 
of being impossible if the expectation is to achieve cost optimality. 
Automated systems are necessary to cover the vast search spaces that 
are generated by the combinatorial explosion of potential 
configuration. 
This paper described the recent work in this area implemented in the 
HiP-HOPS safety analysis and optimization tool. Two modes of 
operation are shown, allocation to components as intended by the 
ISO 26262 standard, and the theoretical allocation down to the level 
of component failure modes.  
The approach described here is not a ‘fire and forget’, one-time 
application to provide automatic safety standard compliance. Rather 
it should be considered as an assistive technique to help inform 
engineer choices in their efforts for cost-effective standard 
compliance; one that can be applied iteratively throughout the design 
life of a system. 
Comparison of the two modes reveals the economic benefits 
available where we are able to use the latter, more granulated 
allocation process. Where this is not possible specialized component 
focused algorithms offer potential advantages over simply converting 
the results. In all cases, it is more efficient working with a smaller 
search space, and in some cases may provide superior, more cost 
effective solutions, though this will depend on the cost heuristic 
being used. 
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